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Abstract
Especially in lower-income countries, the distribution of renewable resources in open
access settings often reflects the non-cooperative spatial extraction decisions of many
individuals who spread out across a landscape. These individuals recognize trade-
offs between distance to the resource, density, and competition amongst extractors.
In this paper we present a game theoretic model that explicitly accommodates such
explicitly spatial non-cooperative behavior with respect to the extraction of a station-
ary renewable natural resource, such as a non-timber forest products or bivalvia (for
example, oysters, clams), that is located in a two dimensional landscape. Villagers that
have identical labor allocations and preferences are shown to undertake very different
extraction pathways in equilibrium. For example, some may extract in more congested
patches closer to the village while others may extract in less crowded but more dis-
tant patches. For many parameterizations, we find multiple spatial Nash equilibria
that differ with respect to the number of villagers at each resource location, whether
individual villagers extract from one or multiple locations, and the extent and spatial
pattern of resource degradation. In addition to finding equilibria with widely different
actions taken by identical extractors, the analysis here demonstrates the impact of sim-
plifying assumptions for spatial decisions on predictions of policy impact, resource
distributions, and conflict.
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1 Introduction
Rural people in low and middle-income countries tend to be highly dependent on the
natural resource base. Whether these individuals extract from forests, hunt wildlife,
or catch fish, they make decisions over where to go to collect resources within a two-
dimensional landscape. Spatial patterns of resource stocks and extraction affect the
production of ecosystem services and economic outcomes. In de facto open access
settings such as those often found in forests and fisheries in lower-income countries,
these patterns derive from the non-cooperative actions of multiple potential resource
extractors. When those resources grow in a patchy landscape, villagers make decisions
about the number and specific set of patches from which to extract and the level of
extraction intensity in each patch. In making these decisions, villagers consider the
travel costs of accessing different patches and their opportunity costs of time, the
resource stock in each patch, and the extraction decisions of other villagers.
Our field experiences highlight how villagers consistently discuss their extraction
decisions in the context of resource availability in different locations, the travel and
distance costs of reaching these locations, and spreading out to avoid competition with
other extractors. In Xishuangbanna, China, villagers describe a willingness to travel
to particular sites known to be productive sources of mushrooms, but describe fuel-
wood and wild vegetable extraction as more extensive, with the resource distributed
throughout the landscape (Albers and Grinspoon 1997). In Thailand, villagers describe
informal agreements between villages that divide Khao Yai National Park into pie-
wedges for (illegal) extraction to avoid conflict between villages from overlapping
extraction and the resulting resource degradation (Albers and Grinspoon 1997; Albers
and Robinson 2007). In Tanzania, community-based forest managers determine the
forest entry points for extraction but villagers report that they spread apart from each
other to reduce competition for the resource (personal communication, 2013). These
observations suggest that understanding resource patterns and resource use there-
fore requires modeling how individual extractor spatial decisions aggregate across all
extractors in the landscape.
Yet despite the prevalence of non-cooperative spatial resource extraction, many
models make simplifying assumptions about extractors’ spatial decisions or about
the interactions of villagers. As examples, many models assume a representative
agent; characterize all extractors as allocating labor the same way across patches
and wage labor; or constrain extractors’ locations such as to only one location, or
along one ray (Robinson et al. 2002, 2008; López-Feldman and Wilen 2008; Albers
2010; Behringer and Upmann 2014). Such assumptions, while reasonable for some
resources and behaviors, cannot accommodate situations in which extractors choose
different pathways through a landscape, and have the opportunity to extract in several
places along their chosen path. Thus these more constrained models cannot explore,
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for example, how moving from a non-cooperative de facto open access landscape
to a managed landscape affects extractors differentially; or how the introduction of
a protected area within the landscape affects the spatial pattern of resource density
outside the protected areas through leakage and thus the aggregate ecosystem services
provided by the landscape; or how management policies affect the concentration of
extractors in different locations, and thus the potential for greater or lower conflict
situations.
The objective of this paper is therefore to develop a flexible model that accom-
modates these more heterogeneous extractor choices and interactions, to provide
greater insights into resource extraction, and to explore the implications of various
assumptions that constrain extraction choices. We employ a spatial agent based imple-
mentation method to find spatial Nash equilibria resulting from a group of identical
extractors, with the same goals, labor endowment and landscape, yet who make indi-
vidual decisions over pathways through the patchy resource, extraction locations, and
intensity of extraction at each location. As such, our paper has similarities with sorting
models such as Bayer and Timmins (2005) and Timmins and Murdock’s (2007) spatial
Nash bargaining game.
For multiple extractors making spatially explicit choices within a landscape, the
results provide new insights into the comparison to previous approaches particularly
with respect to variation in extractor choices of extraction pathways, the existence
of multiple equilibria, and spatial patterns of resource stocks. This flexible model
accommodates the reality that all villagers do not necessarily collect from the same
areas of the forest (as found in a number of models in the literature, such as Robinson
et al. 2008), nor do they necessarily allocate themselves as would a social planner, but
rather may spread out taking account of the spatial landscape and the choices of other
villagers. Thus our model has clear implications for, for example, the siting of pro-
tected areas in landscapes where people traditionally extract resources, and exclusion
from specific areas would affect individual extractors differently. The exploration of
our model’s results reveals the role of distances between patches in determining the
extraction heterogeneity across extractors in equilibrium.
The next section describes the setting, the spatial extraction model, and the solution
method. The third section presents and discusses the results of the model for different
distance settings, and compares the resulting equilibria with constrained extraction
location choices. Section four concludes.
2 Setting, economic model, and solutionmethod
2.1 System description
The system of interest is representative of a rural setting in a lower-income coun-
try, with a renewable natural resource spatially distributed across a two dimensional
landscape. The resource is stationary and re-grows, such as is the case for many non-
timber forest products (NTFPs). The resource is de facto open access, and villagers
living adjacent to the area extract the resource across space. Besides extraction of the
resource, the locals have access to a wage generating job market.
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Fig. 1 Illustration of conceptual model developed to study NTFP extraction, displaying the spatial landscape
showing village, resource patches, distances between patches, and permissible pathways
2.2 Conceptual model of villagers and spatial resource setting
We conceptualize this renewable resource extraction setting to have the following
characteristics (Fig. 1):
There are N villagers and one “village site” or extractor entry point to the de facto
open access landscape. A stationary renewable resource is found in discrete “patches,”
separated by a distance that takes labor time to traverse. The resource extraction is
followed by resource re-growth. The spatial setting contains one village located at a
distance from a landscape comprising six resource patches arranged in a two by three
grid, with three resource patches at increasing distance from the village along each of
two “rays” (Fig. 1). Each patch’s location is described (r,y) by its ray, r1, 2, and its
placement at increasing distance from the village on that ray, y1, 2, 3. We assume
that no diagonal travel between rays occurs.
Villagers are identical with respect to labor endowments, effectiveness of their labor
whether extracting or working, and preferences. They maximize expected period-by-
period returns to labor because they have no long-term rights to the resource to enable
planning. They experience no fatigue from distance traveled or amount of resource
being carried. Villagers allocate their labor either to resource extraction (including
distance required to get to a particular set of resource patches) or wage work (where the
wage is a function of total villager labor supply). Any resource that the villager extracts
is sold for an exogenous price at a nearby market. Villagers make their decisions while
considering the actions of all other villagers. We solve for the equilibrium resource
extraction decisions over both locations and quantities for this group of extractors
who face labor allocation trade-offs across distance time costs, extraction, and a non-
resource extraction labor option.
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2.3 Individual extractor’s optimization decision
Each individual, i, of V extractors seeks to maximize their individual single period
net returns, Wi, by allocating their labor endowment Li across extraction labor in each
patch (r,y), liry; wage labor liw; and distance travel costs liD, which depend on the path
taken through the patchy landscape. The travel costs are thus labor costs that reduce
the available labor time. The extracted resource is sold at an exogenous price, p; and
wage labor receives a wage, w, which is a function of the total wage labor supply of
all extractors. An extractor’s labor allocation choices define that extractor’s optimal
set of patches from which to extract, the pathway for that extraction, and the optimal
amount to extract from each patch visited. Each extractor makes decisions based on
the labor allocation decisions of all other extractors. We write an individual extractor’s
optimization as follows:
max
Li
[Wi (Li )]  max
(li,r,y ,li,w)
[
p
∑
r,y
hi,r,y(li,r,y) + wi
(
li,w
)] (1)
s.t.
Li 
(∑
r,y
li,r,y
)
+ li,w + li D
Hr,y  q Rr,y
⎛
⎝ V∑
j1
l j,r,y
⎞
⎠
γ
; γ < 1
hi,r,y  li,r,y∑V
j1 l j,r,y
Hr,y
wi (l)  w · li,w∑V
j1 l j,w
·
⎛
⎝ V∑
j1
l j,w
⎞
⎠
β
where β < 1
In Eq. 1, hi,r,y is the amount of the renewable resource extracted by extractor i, through
the allocation of labor li,r,y in a particular patch (r, y). The total amount—across all
villagers—harvested in any patch, Hr,y, follows a modified Schaefer-type function that
allows for diminishing returns to total labor effort extracting from a particular patch
(Zhang and Smith 2011) where q measures an extractability (or catchability) coefficient
and Rr,y is the resource stock of patch y in ray r at the start of a time period. Thus within
a particular time period, the total resource extraction in patch (r, y), Hr,y, is a function
of the extraction decisions of all the extractors choosing to extract from that patch.
The total harvest each period, Hr,y, is assumed to be shared in direct proportion to the
time each individual extractor spend in a that patch. The wage function is assumed to
be endogenous to labor supply with diminishing returns to labor, which is consistent
with a lower-income setting. In essence, the wage function shares characteristics with
the harvest function but is assumed to have less steep diminishing returns to labor
(i.e. β > γ ). Being a set of optimal labor allocations for all villagers, the model’s
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solution comprises individually optimal labor allocation decisions within a spatial
Nash equilibrium. Between periods, the resource in each patch partially regenerates
after harvest, Rr,y , according to a logistic growth function:
Rr,y  r ·
(
Rr,y − Hr,y
) · (1 − Rr,y − Hr,y
Kr,y
)
R′r,y  Rr,y − Hr,y + Rr,y (2)
In Eq. 2, r is the natural growth rate, Kr,y is the patch carrying capacity and R′r,y is
the resource stock after the regrowth.
The sum of the individual labor allocation decisions results in a per-period spatial
Nash equilibrium of the labor market and landscape pattern of extraction. Following
periods of extraction, the analysis determines the long run socio-ecological steady
state (after sufficient time periods such that R′r,y ≈ Rr,y).
2.4 Conceptual solutionmethod
With many individual extractors making complex spatial labor allocation decisions,
finding the spatial Nash equilibria requires either simplifying assumptions or com-
putational methods. Because we aim to explore the variety of individual decisions
possible, we implement an agent-based method to iterate sequentially through each
extractor’s choice until an equilibrium is found. Conceptually, in each iteration, an
extractor makes a “claim” to a plan (locations and amounts of extraction) in response
to the other villagers’ claimed plans. The iterations continue with this sequential updat-
ing of extractors’ plans until no extractor can improve on their plan given the claims
of the other villagers, which defines the set of equilibrium plans for all extractors. This
mechanism for adapting labor allocation plans is a transparent and realistic mecha-
nism that allows for agents’ behavior to be heterogeneous. We base this mechanism
on empirical studies such as those reviewed by Bodin and Crona (2009) and our own
field experience indicating that villagers in this type of resource extraction setting
communicate and generally avoid behaving identically.
This agent based method finds non-cooperative Nash equilibria for different param-
eter settings without imposing constraints on extractors’ choices of pathways and
extraction patterns. The resulting set of extraction patterns is the emergent outcome
from the interactions of the agents’ (here villagers) actions (Bonabeau 2002; Farmer
and Foley 2009; An 2012). Our approach differs from those approaches that use equi-
librium conditions directly in their solution methods (for example, Robinson et al.
2008), thus relying on tacit assumptions such as that all individuals make identical
decisions. In contrast, this model and numerical implementation find equilibria in
which extractors identical in labor endowments and preferences can make different
extraction labor allocation decisions that maximize their individual returns to labor
within a Nash equilibrium setting.
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2.5 Spatial agent basedmethod to determine the spatial–temporal equilibrium
To find a per-period Nash equilibrium, we undertake an iterative process of labor
allocation decisions chosen by each individual extractor to maximize returns to their
labor, given the initial or most recent plans of all other extractors. In order to find the
long term spatial–temporal equilibrium, step 7, we iterate the process in steps 1–4 to
find the quantity of wage labor and the amount to be extracted (step 5) and the amount
of resource re-growth (step 6). The process is as follows:
1. Initial condition. All extractors are assigned an initial plan of their labor allocation
across resource patches (with a pre-harvest initial resource density per patch) and
wage labor.
2. Extractors are then given an order in which they state their plan.
3. One at a time, each extractor is allowed to adapt her planned labor across patches
and wage labor. All extractors know distances to, and current state of, each resource
patch, the price of the NTFP, returns to wage labor, and the most recent plans of the
other extractors. The extractor calculates her returns to labor in the different patches
and to wage labor for all plausible labor allocation alternatives, and chooses the
one that would yield the maximum return to her labor. If multiple equally valued
alternatives exist, the first one encountered is chosen.
4. When all extractors have stated their plan, the process in step 3 is repeated until no
extractor wishes to change her chosen labor allocation. Thus one by one extractors
update (i.e. choose to keep or adapt) their plans iteratively, until each has found a
labor allocation from which she does not wish to deviate, given the stated labor
allocations plans of the other extractors.
5. Single period spatial Nash equilibrium. The end of step 4 implies that a spatial
Nash equilibrium has been found and step 5 has extractors act on these final plans
at the same time.
6. The period then ends and partial regrowth of the resource follows.
7. Temporal equilibrium or long run steady state. Steps 1-6 are repeated until the
resource stocks and the labor allocations show a stable repeating pattern, at which
point the long-run steady state for the myopic single period non-cooperative equi-
librium has been reached. To identify repeating patterns that do not occur period
to period but instead occur cyclically over many periods, the algorithm searches
for such cycles to determine multi-year cyclical steady states.
The algorithm is easily adjusted to explore more restrictive non-cooperative equi-
libria by imposing conditions such as extractors only being able to extract from one
patch; extractors only being able to extract from one ray; or all extractors choosing
the same extraction pattern to mimic a representative agent assumption.
2.6 Identifyingmultiple equilibria
With many extractors making complex spatial decisions, many different equilibria can
arise. To identify many of those equilibria, we evaluate three aspects of the mechanisms
for the adaptation of extractors’ plans during the iterative process. First, we choose
three extremes for the initial condition of assigned labor allocation plans (Step 1
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above): all extractors allocate all their labor to wage labor; all extractors allocate their
labor equally across each patch and wage labor; and each extractor is given a randomly
assigned extraction pattern. Second, we vary the order in which extractors update their
plans between being the same order for each iteration or randomized. Third, we repeat
these two variations for different levels of initial resource stocks (i.e. different levels
of forest degradation for the initial condition). As with any heuristic algorithm to find
approximate solutions to complex optimization problems, these variations in the initial
conditions and the ordering of individual choices within the iteration identify many
of the multiple equilibria, but cannot guarantee finding all possible equilibria.
We explore the impact of distance on the prevalence of multiple equilibria below.
Further sensitivity analysis to study the effects of varying the models parameter values
is presented in the supplementary material (SM). We also vary the initial allocation
to each extractor for each time period to study its effect on the temporal equilibria.
It is varied between using the previous period’s allocation as the starting point and
assigning a new initial condition per time period.
2.7 Numerical implementation
In making a numerical implementation, we introduce discreteness into the labor allo-
cation choice, with the level of resolution reflecting the need for a manageable number
of computations. Specifically, extraction in a patch, li,r,y, or wage labor, li,w, is allowed
in multiples of 5% of an extractor’s available labor time, after accounting for time spent
travelling. Each extractor can visit any number of patches with the constraint that travel
time cannot be greater than her total labor endowment. The travel time reflects the
shortest travel time costs between patches from which the extractor extracts, assum-
ing diagonal paths are not permitted. This model and solution method can represent
highly heterogeneous settings, as we show below in Sect. 3.1. However, in order to
understand the basic dynamics of the model, after the first heterogeneous example,
we limit the analysis to the study of the symmetrical case with all distances equal,
d0  di , dr  d, and demonstrate the impact of distance for three different specific
distances between patches, as shown in Sect. 3.2. In the supplementary material we
present the model parameter values used in all cases.
3 Results and discussion
All villagers are identical with respect to labor endowment and objective function. Yet
solutions to the model demonstrate that, in equilibrium, extractors choose different
pathways; extract from different patches; may variously extract from one or multiple
patches on their chosen path; and some villagers may not extract at all but only engage
in wage labor. Extractors spread out to reduce congestion and extract the rents available
rather than behaving identically, reflecting what we have observed in practice.
In their sets and pathways of extraction, in equilibrium, individual extractors fall into
three general types: patch “specializers” (denoted by S1, S2, or S3 in the figures below,
depending on whether the individual extracts in the first, second, or third patch in a ray)
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who extract from only one patch; “multipatch”(denoted MPxy in the figures) extractors
who extract from two or three patches along one ray; and “multiray” (denoted MRx,y
in the figures) extractors who extract from patches in both rays. Non-extractors are
denoted by “WAGE” in the figures. Which and how many (denoted #V in the figures)
of each type of extractor and non-extractor are found in equilibrium is endogenous
to the model parameterization. Finally, depending on the distances between patches,
the four different variations of modelling the adaptation of extractors’ plans can find
multiple equilibria for the same sets of distances. We present subsets or examples of the
many Nash equilibria that our solution method finds, and we choose those equilibria
that highlight particularly interesting aspects of the model and solution method.
3.1 Equilibrium patterns of extraction: heterogeneous landscape
To begin, we explore the results in a policy relevant landscape with heterogeneous
forest densities across rays and patches, which reflects the flexibility of this agent
based solution method (Fig. 2, parameter details in SM 3.2). We find five distinct
villager types in the equilibrium, which are represented visually in the first five panels
Fig. 2 Extraction patterns in heterogeneous landscape. For each villager type—wage only, specializer in
patch i, Si, or multipatch extractor, MPiii,—this figure shows the extraction pattern illustrated as a path with
the percentage of time spent harvesting in each patch. The number of villagers per type (#V), and the travel
time, wage and returns per type
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of the figure. One villager does not extract, but rather allocates all their time to wage
labor (WAGE). Five villagers specialize (Sx), two in the patches closest to the village
and three in one patch furthest from the village. Eight villagers extract from two patches
in the same ray (MPxy); and four villagers extract from all three patches in one ray
(MP123). The aggregation of these individual decisions leads to the heterogeneous
resource densities across patches (sixth panel of the figure).
3.2 Effect of distance on equilibrium patterns: homogeneous initial landscape
3.2.1 Intermediate distance d  0.05
With intermediate distances between patches, multiple Nash equilibria arise that com-
prise many different types of extractors. We highlight two of the equilibria that emerge
for d= 0.05 (Fig. 3) that are fundamentally different. In one, each villager “distance
specializes” (Fig. 3a), extracting from patches in one or both rays at the same dis-
tance from the village. In the other highlighted equilibrium, villagers “ray specialize”
(Fig. 3b), extracting from one or multiple patches in one ray. The equilibrium resource
densities after harvest for Equilibrium 1 is 59, 62 and 67% of the carrying capacity.
The corresponding percentages for Equilibrium 2 are 60, 63 and 65%.
In other equilibria for the intermediate distance d= 0.05, we find a combination
of multipatch, multiray, and specializer extractors. In a particular equilibrium, up to
four different extractor types emerge who extract in at least one of the four patches
closest to the village (SM). This outcome illustrates the considerable heterogeneity in
extractors’ spatial extraction decisions, as they locate across the landscape to take full
advantage of the available rents. Over the various multiple Nash equilibria found for
this distance, out of the total of 18 extractors, the number choosing only wage labor
varies from 1 to 3; the number of extractors only going to one ray varies from 2 to 15;
and the number of extractors focusing on only one distance into the forest varies from
5 to 16.
3.2.2 Large distance: d  0.15
In contrast, when distance costs are sufficiently large, for each distance there is one
unique spatial Nash equilibrium in which each villager either extracts from just one
patch or only engages in wage labor. For d= 0.15, there are 13 “specializers” while five
villagers only engage in wage labor (see SM Figure SM1). The distance to the patches
protect them for this landscape and the level of degradation is low. The equilibrium
resource densities after harvest across both rays at increasing distance from the village
are 55, 66 and 86% of the carrying capacity. That density profile reflects that distance
costs limit extraction time.
3.2.3 Small distance: d 0.005
When patches are almost contiguous, d= 0.005, the distance costs of moving between
patches is very low and the spatial dimension almost disappears. Many Nash equilibria
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Fig. 3 Extractor types and labor choices for two Nash equilibria for the “Intermediate” distance (d 0.05)
scenario. In the first equilibrium (a), the majority of the extractors extract at a certain distance away from
the village. The second equilibrium (b) is characterized by a majority of extractors going to only one ray
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are found in which most or all extractors extract from every patch (Multiray123,123),
with varying levels of labor allocated to each patch (see SM Figure SM2). The equilib-
rium resource densities after harvest for are 50, 50 and 51% of the carrying capacity.
3.2.4 Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis was performed to explore the effect on the results of varying
the model parameters (see SM). For the intermediate distance scenario, the individual
parameters were varied systematically with all parameters varied at least twice, with
one low value and one high value (see SM for more detail). The results from the
sensitivity analysis show that the simulation results presented here are robust. The
most noteworthy result from the sensitivity analysis was that for a larger value on γ
(see Eq. 1) that allows for initially less diminishing harvest per extraction time, the
tendency of distance specialization is replaced by ray specialization.
3.3 Discussion of the equilibrium patterns of extractor choices
A number of clear regularities emerge from our model simulations. First, when patches
are close together, individual extractors spread their resource collection across patches
and rays, resulting in a large number of extractors in each patch, particularly in the
closest patches. When patches are further apart, we find more instances of different
types of specialization, some extract at only one distance, some in only one ray,
and some in only one patch. At larger distances still, all villagers are wage or patch
specializers. Second, we find multiple equilibria when the patches are not too far apart;
whereas for larger distances we find a unique Nash equilibrium for each distance. Third,
as we parametrically increase distance between the patches, we stop finding multiray
extractors at relatively small distances, such as for an intermediate parameterization
with d0.075, whilst we continue to find multipatch extractors (i.e. ray specializers)
for larger distances.
The interplay of distance costs moving from one resource patch to another, the spa-
tial inter-connectedness of patches (such that individuals extracting from more distant
patches must pass through the closer patches), and diminishing returns to total labor
extracting in a particular patch, drives these complex patterns of equilibrium extrac-
tion. Individually, extractors face trade-offs between spending labor time travelling
to more distant patches, and spending more time extracting from patches they must
pass through to reach these distant patches. These choices are more pronounced when
patches are further apart. Individuals only extracting from nearer patches cannot do
better incurring the greater distance time costs to extract in the more distant patches,
whilst villagers extracting from these more distant patches cannot do better by allo-
cating any labor to extraction in the nearer patches. Thus for large distances, we find
a unique Nash equilibrium with all villagers specializing, implying that some extrac-
tors pass through nearby patches without any extraction on their way to more distant
patches (see patches marked 0% and dotted outline in Figs. 2 and 3); and with resource
stocks greater and marginal returns to labor higher with more distant the patch from
the village.
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When multiple equilibria exist for a given distance d, at least some individuals
must extract from more than one patch (i.e. at least some extractors are not patch
specializers). Some of these equilibria differ in the set of extractor types that are found.
For example, when the solution method’s initial labor allocation plan for all villagers
is all wage labor, equilibria more frequently have extractors mainly specializing at one
distance into the resource landscape but in both rays (see Equilibrium 1 in Fig. 3). In
contrast, when the solution method’s initial labor allocation plans are random spatial
patterns, the equilibria are dominated by ray specializers (see Equilibrium 2 in Fig. 3).
Other multiple equilibria comprise the same set of extractor types but differ in how
extractors split their labor across the same set of patches (and are hence simple expected
permutations of villagers’ extraction patterns). These multiple equilibria occur when
the average returns to labor for wage and extraction in different patches are equal,
implying distances between patches do not drive wedges between the marginal returns
to labor in these different patches. Further, the total labor extracting in each patch is
approximately the same for all equilibria.
Finally, there is a natural asymmetry between moving within a ray, and moving
across rays, with the cutoff distance for finding multiray extractors smaller than for
finding multipatch extractors. By moving laterally, extractors have access to an addi-
tional patch in the alternate ray at a distance time cost that is half of that of moving to
the next patch along the same ray, but this patch is more accessible to individuals only
extracting within that alternate ray. This kind of tradeoff underpins the occurrence of
the two different types of multiple equilibria in which “ray specialization” or “distance
specialization” is more frequent among the extractors.
3.4 Constrained extraction
To consider the impact of common modeling assumptions, we contrast the long-run
equilibrium patterns of resource extraction explored above with equilibria reached if
we make various modeling assumptions that restrict the choices extractors can make
over the path they take through the landscape and the number of patches that they can
extract from.
3.4.1 One patch restriction
First, we consider the implications of constraining individuals to extract from one patch
(López-Feldman and Wilen 2008, restrict extractors to one location). This restriction
only affects extractors in lower distance settings (including our intermediate and small
distance examples), because, in high distance cost settings, unconstrained extractors
are all patch specializers. We find a unique spatial Nash Equilibrium for each distance.
Although this restricted case forces each extractor to harvest in one location, their
location decisions are not pre-defined and the results demonstrate spatial heterogeneity
in the chosen location.
For the intermediate distance in this one-patch constrained case, we find fewer
extractors on average in each patch, with those extracting from patch 3 obtaining
returns to their labor almost 20% greater than for the unconstrained individuals who
123
E. O. Sterner et al.
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
7
5
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
5
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
7
5
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
5
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
7
5
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
5
0
Patch 1 Patch 2 Patch 3 
One Patch Constrained
One Ray Constrained
Unconstrained
Fig. 4 Impact of constraints on villager choices on average resource stocks
extract from patch 3, but those extracting from closer patches obtaining lower returns
(Figure SM4a). The constrained small distance setting produces an equilibrium with
3 extractors in each of the six patches. This pattern is in distinct contrast to the uncon-
strained model where all 18 individuals extract from the closest patches, and returns
to labor are lower. Because one-patch constrained extractors do not have the option
to cover their distance costs by extracting in multiple patches along a pathway, for
smaller distances, the one-patch constraint in general leads to fewer extractors extract-
ing more from more distant patches, and higher equilibrium levels of resource stocks
in nearby patches (Fig. 4). Thus the one-patch constraint mischaracterizes both the
extractor behavior and the pattern of resource stocks in any setting with low to mod-
erate distance costs.
3.4.2 One ray restriction
Similar to the one patch restriction, a one ray restriction only affects the equilibrium
for smaller distances for which at least some unconstrained extractors would choose
to extract from more than one ray (including the intermediate and small distance
examples above). Many studies, implicitly or explicitly, assume extraction along a
line from a village (for example Albers and Robinson 2011). With our model, we
still find multiple equilibria in which some extractors are multipatch extractors, and
others specializers. However, by construction there are no multiray extractors. Such
modelling choices change the spatial patterns of resource extractors, but have minimal
impact on the spatial resource stock profile for the studied landscape geometries.
3.4.3 Representative extractor
The findings here support Noailly et al. (2003: 184)’s statement that “agents can exhibit
heterogeneous characteristics, interactions between which often lead to ‘emergent’
patterns that cannot be easily predicted at the population level by using representative
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agent models”. To characterize the representative agent setting here, we constrain
all extractors to follow the same pathway through the landscape and make the same
labor choices over extraction. We find that for both small and intermediate distances,
extractors enter all six patches, behaving as identical Multiray123,123 extractors.
For the small distance d0.005, compared with the unconstrained case, assuming a
representative agent leads to considerably lower extraction per patch and per extractor,
and consequently equilibrium stock levels and wage labor are higher. This difference
in extraction labor occurs because the representative agent simulates implicitly a rudi-
mentary form of cooperation among identically behaving extractors. For the large
distance case, the representative agent allocates all labor to wage labor, in distinct
contrast to the unconstrained model.
There are some distances for which the long run equilibrium is cyclical for the rep-
resentative agent case. For example, for d0.135, the long run equilibrium comprises
a repeating cycle where the representative extractor extracts as a Multiray12,12 extrac-
tor for two time periods, and then every third period, they only do wage labor. This
cyclical equilibrium is characterized by alternating intense and zero extraction over
space and over time. Such “pulsing” is found in the fishing literature (Sluczanowski
1984; Nøstbakken 2006; Maroto et al. 2009), in situations where moving between
resource patches is costly, or when there is uncertainty, or, as is the case here, where
there is a representative agent (as is also the case for Robinson et al. 2008).
4 Conclusion
The model and implementation developed here permit exploration of the patterns of
resource extraction and resource stocks that derive from the interactions of multiple
extractors’ spatial labor allocation decisions in a patchy resource setting. Villagers
that face the same landscape, objective function, and labor endowment choose very
different sets of patches from which to extract, with these choices highly sensitive to the
distances between resource patches. Using a spatial agent based method of sequential
labor allocation plans that iterates towards a Nash equilibrium, our solution method
reveals the spatially heterogeneous extractor behavior. Further, the solutions clearly
demonstrate that simplifying assumptions such as representative agents and single-
patch extraction can misrepresent the extraction patterns across the spatial setting and
cannot reveal complex patterns of extraction pathways or heterogeneity in choices
even from ex ante identical extractors. A representative agent assumption is most
likely to misrepresent the extraction patterns of villagers when distances between
patches are larger, and underestimate total extraction and thus degradation. A single
patch extraction assumption is most likely to misrepresent the extraction patterns of
villagers when distances between patches are smaller.
Different model assumptions generally suggest small differences in resource profile
and overall stocks, but much greater differences in the number of extractors found in
each patch. The unconstrained model typically finds many more individuals extracting
in each patch. This outcome has implications for conflict between extractors, and
for species that are not extracted or hunted, but are sensitive to human presence.
Differences in the returns to individuals are also found for the variously constrained
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model assumptions explored. Such differences in the returns to individuals are much
smaller for the unconstrained model. Multiple equilibria are found and exhibit a variety
of differences in villagers’ extraction pattern that do not affect the overall extraction.
This model and solution method provide the needed flexibility to explore important
policy options relevant particularly to a lower-income setting, in contrast to many more
simplified or constrained models. For example, our model shows explicitly the extent
to which we should expect to find relatively large numbers of villagers extracting in any
one area, with the concomitant scope for conflict between these villagers under a de
facto open access setting. A natural next step in ongoing work explores how the spatial
pattern of extraction is predicted to change if extraction is coordinated, and the extent
to which extractors are better off and the resource less degraded. This analysis will
allow us to explore whether, and the extent to which, the benefits of management and
coordinated extraction outweigh the costs across dimensions of ecosystem services,
livelihoods, and conflict. This model is particularly useful for exploring explicitly
spatial management of a landscape, in which policy makers can choose to introduced
protected zones, managed zones, and open access zones; or alternatively to restrict
the total amount extracted and allow extractors to choose from which locations they
collect the resource. This paper highlights sensitivity to model assumptions that have
implications for estimated conflict, equity, and natural resource management.
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